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Five Thousand Dollars a Day
AN INQUIRY INTO THE CIVIL PENALTY CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATION
OF A FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CEASE AND DESIST ORDER.
By H. THOMAS AUSTERN*
We do not wish to be understood, however, as holding that
the generalized language of paragraph (2) would necessarily
withstand scrutiny under the 1959 amendments. The severity
of possible penalities prescribed by the amendments for viola-
tions of orders which have become final underlines the
necessity for fashioning orders which are, at the outset, suf-
ficiently clear and precise to avoid raising serious questions as
to their meaning and application. FTC v Henry Broch 6
Co., 368 U.S. 360, 367-68 (1961)
(Emphasis supplied.)
Preliminary
Every particularized phase of the rapidly expanding federal
administrative law is but a part of the whole fabric of its develop-
ment. Sound growth or undesirable distortion in the procedures
of one agency may be colored and shaded as inquiry is made and
changes occur in the operations of other agencies. A broad ap-
proach often illuminates the particular problem.
Most of us, however, are far too close to the active arguments
and the babble of criticism to acquire any real perspective. Perhaps
some future definitive history of the remarkable growth of the
administrative process, as a technique of government regulation
over the past five decades, will bring its many strands into sharper
focus.
One that may be illuminated is the inescapable American habit
of hopefully applying a method of regulation that has worked
*Presented by Mr. Austem of the Washington, D. C. Bar, to the Section of
Antitrust Law of the Amencan Bar Assocation, August 7, 1962.
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effectively at some time in one area to every emergent future
problem. If a "commission" proves cffcctive in the early regulation
of railroads, it is thought to be equally useful thereafter in trade
regulation, in controlling the sale of securities, in administenng
social security, in dealing with war damage claims, or in controlling
the use of atomic energy That the new problems are wholly
different, or far more complex, or dynamically demanding, is
seldom a deterrent.' Analytical examination of the administrative
process is not advanced by resort to easy labels.
Another curciously contradictory pattern runs through most
procedural changes. This is the conflict between the realization
that the regulatory problems are so complicated that they can be
dealt with only by an institutionalized administrative agency (pre-
sumably endowed with expertise) and the inevitable impatience
of the agencies and the public over the time required for truly
knowledgeable and penetrating resolution. There is constant resort
to short cuts, to notions of pnna faieze showings, 2 to attempted
official notice of facts not of record3 and to efforts to authonze
temporary administrative orders pendente lite.
4
But the most pervasive, though often currently imperceptible,
characteristic of the evolving administrative process is the slow-
swing of the pendulum from judicial approbation to judicial
limitation, or from agency excess or obduracy to congressional
curbing restraints. These oscillations have been demonstrated in
the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,5 in
the admonitions about judicial review in Universal Camera,6 and
1 For example, after sixteen years of commission administration, Congress is
now considering the substitution of a single Administrator for the five-man Atomic
Energy Commission. In 1946 a similar substitution was made for the onginal
Social Security Board. 60 Stat. 1095-96.
2 Compare Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., No. 6642, FTC, Sept. 9, 1959; and
Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc., No. 7720, FTC, March, 1962 (burden of proving
affirmative availability put on respondent); with American Oil Co., No. 8183, FTC,
June 27, 1962 (substantial price differences equated with secondary level com-
petitive injury).
3 See Dayton Rubber Co., No. 7604, FTC, June 14, 1960 (Opinion of the
hearing examiner); Manco Watch Strap Co., No. 7785 FTC March 13, 1962;
compare FTC Rules §1.61 (June, 1962), authorizing "Trade'Regulation Rules"
expressing the "experience and judgment of the Commission" on the substantive
requirements of administered s'tatutes.
4 See H.R. 8830, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
6 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §1001 (1958).
6 Umversal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 840 U.S. 474 (1951). Mr. Justice
Frankfurter observed that in the admnstrative Procedure Act, "Congress expressed
a mood." Id. at 487.
[Vol. 51,
F=w THousAND DOLL"AS A DAY
in the current efforts to enact improvements or drastic changes in
agency procedure.7 Often this braking of accelerated agency action
beyond the limits of public acceptance is preceded by bar associa-
tion and other inquiries. Prior to World XVar II there was the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure and
currently there is the President's newly created Administrative
Conference of the United States?
At the present time, we appear to be at the mid-point in what
may turn out to be a wide swing of the pendulum in the area of
enforcement of Federal Trade Commission orders. By a series of
amendments, recounted in details below, the historical concept of
a Commission cease and desist order has been completely changed.
As originally conceived, a cease and desist order was largely a
precatory admonition, convertible where necessary in rare in-
stances into a judicial injunctive command. This has now been
changed into a self-executing order whose violation carries, when
and as the Commission seeks to demand them, monetary civil
penalties of staggering proportions.
Paradoxically, the potential fine for violation of a Commission
cease and desist order, issued under the uncertain parameters of
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act or the wooly words
of the Robinson-Patman Act, can be far larger than that Congress
has recently specified as an increased criminal fine for hard-core
Sherman Act violations.10
Accordingly, it may be both timely and useful to examine the
derivation, the scope, and the possibic application of these civil
penalties, the extent and reasonableness of the financial hazards to
which respondents are exposed under the varieties of orders being
issud by the Trade Commission, and some of the policy considera-
tions that ought to apply both to the writing of orders and to the
exaction of cumulative penalties for their violation.
7 S. 1275, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). See Berger, Removal of judicial
Functions from a Federal Trade Commission to a Trade Court: A Reply to Mr.
Kintner, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 199 (1960). See also Administrative Practice Act Intro-
duced in the 85th Congress, 43 A.B.A.J. 424 (1957).
8 The final report of the committee expressed dissatisfaction with administra-
tive fact finding procedures. Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure 92 (Jan. 1941).
0 Exec. Order No. 10934, 26 Fed. Reg. 3233 (1961).
loAct of July 7, 1955, 69 Stat. 282 (1955). 15 U.S.C. §1 (1958) (raising
penalty to $50,000); ef. United States v. Wise, 82 Sup. Ct. 1354 (1962).
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II
Causal Congressional Conversions
There is no question that the facts as stated by my good
friend from Arkansas are correct. He has demonstrated
clearly that the word 'sleeper' is appropriate, in that we were
all asleep. [Laughter]. There is no question, no one at the
time recognized that on an oleomargarine bill we were par-
ticularly violating the procedure and changing the funda-
mental law in relation to the Federal Trade Commission Act,
and so the word 'sleeper is used advisedly. It is no reflection
upon any one Senator. I am really surprised that we are so
wide awake, with the multitude of duties and with all the
problems thrust upon us, with our mail and our visitors,
attendance upon committees and on the Senate, and 1001
other things. 96 Cong. Rec. 3021 (1950) (remarks of Sen-
ator Wiley).
When Gilbert had the Mikado voice as his "object all sublime
to let the punishment fit the crime," he was perhaps offering
the hope that in an ideal juridical system, the form and severity
of the sanction would always be adapted to the character of the
misconduct.
The original schizoid objectives of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, as well as the story of how the contours
of an "unfair method of competition" were successively expanded,
have frequently been examined. These are as interesting as the
historical derivation of the triplicated Clayton Act enforcement
by the Commission, the Department of justice, and the treble
damage plaintiff." But no knowledgeable legal historian can chal-
lenge that neither in the Federal Trade Commission Act nor in the
Clayton Act, as they emerged in 1914, was there any concept of
criminality Whatever an "unfair method of competition" or "a
substantial lessening of competition" might come to mean, viola-
tion was not to be a crime, and future deterrence was to be achieved
by civil process.
Indeed, those who originally conceived the idea of a Federal
Trade Commission did not envisage it as having any direct regu-
latory authority and certainly no quasi-judicial powers to issue
orders. As its organic statute was ultimately enacted, about a
11See Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission (1924); Austern, The
Parentage and Admmstrative Ontogeny of the Federal Trade Commission, 1955
CCH Antitrust Law Symposium 83.
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month earlier than the Clayton Act, many believed that once the
Trade Commission had defined particular business conduct as "an
unfair method of competition," and had issued its prophylactic
ccase and desist order, the business community would welcome
the codification."-' Thereafter only infrequcnt occasion for any
enforcement proceecding was anticipated. Only in those rare in-
stances whcre there might be delibcrate failure or neglect to obey
the order, would the Commission then apply to a Circuit Court of
Appeals for enforcement.' :'
Twcnty-four years later in the Wheeler-Lea Act of 193814 Con-
grcss both expanded the substantive reach of section 5,'s and in
amazingly casual fashion coinpletely changed the method of en-
forccmcnt.
Aside from the substantive expansion, collaterally involving a
bitter argument as to whether the Trade Commission or the Food
and Drug Administration was to be given authority over food, drug,
and cosmetic advertising, the key procedural change waged upon
Congress was immediate finality for unappealed orders so as to
avoid the "three bites at the apple" of illegality-a first violation to
sustain a Commission complaint and order, a second to secure a
judicial order of enforcement, and a third violation to warrant
punishment for contempt. Cease and desist orders, not appealed
within sixty days, were made automatically final.
Yet equally significant, and far more drastic, was the entirely
novel concept of punishment by civil penalty achon. Without
explanation or elaboration in hearings or debate, this change was
introduced into the Federal Trade Commission Act. Violation of
12 A violation of §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act cannot be the basis
for a treble damage action under §4 of the Clayton Act because the former statute
is not included in the definition of "antitrust laws" under §1 of the Clayton Act,
38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §12 (1958). See Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation
Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958). For the evidentary effect of a consent cease and desist
order, see Brunswck-Balke-Collender Co. v. Amiencan Bowling & Billiard Corp.,
150 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 757 (1945); Proper v. John
Bene & Sons, 295 Fed. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1923).
13 It IS true that the 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act also provided in §5
for court review by the respondent. Curiously, this authority was contained in a
separate and subsequent paragraph. No time limit was imposed on the re-
spondent's seeking of court review. W at was plainly contemplated was general
obedience, and resort to court review or enforcement procedures only m rare
instances.
14 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §45 (1958).
1~o remedy the difficulties revealed by FTC v. Raladam, 283 U.S. 643
(1931), "any unfair method of competition" was expanded to include "or unfair
or deceptive act or practice" occurring in interstate commerce.
1963]
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a Commission order would thereafter result in a forfeiture to the
United States of "a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 for each
violation" recoverable in a civil action brought by the United
States.!"
The legislative history of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment is
wholly unilluminating as to why this change was made from
enforcement by contempt of an order of the reviewing court to
enforcement by civil penalty suit. The revision was offered with a
simple reference to supposedly similar provisions in the Packers
and Stockyards Act of 1921 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.'17 What was to constitute a "violation" and why the penalty
should be $5,000 "for each violation" was never discussed.
Still the intriguing mystery remains as to the origin of this
shift from enforcement through judicial contempt proceedings to
enforcement by civil penalty This must perhaps remain an ex-
ample of informal legislative history which is not discernible in
the formal Congressional documents. As far as the Commission
2
6 The new penalty provison was incorporated as §5(1) and read in full text:
"Any person, partnership, or corporation who violates an order of the Com-
mission to cease and desist after it has become final, and while such order is in
effect, shall forfeit and pay to the United States a civil penalty of not more than
$5,000 for each violation, which shall accrue to the United States and may be
recovered in a civil action brought by the United States."
Section 16 of Wheeler-Lea provided for certification by the Commission to
the Justice Departnent of any case in which an action for penalties is ordered by
the Commission. On occassion, the Justice Department has differed with the
Commission as to whether the action should be brought.
Congress also provided in 1938 in §5(c) that the reviewing court might issue
a temporary injunction operative dunng review when necessary to prevent injury
to the public or to competitors pendente lite. It also provided in §14 that violations
of §5 through false advertisements, where the commodity advertised nght be
injunous to health, would also constitute a misdemeanor punishable by fine up to
$5,000, or $10,000 for a second offense, and by inpnsonment. District court
injunctions pendente lite were authorized in these advertising cases, even before
the issuance of a complaint by the Commission or of a final cease and desist order
(§18). FTC v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1951); National
Health Aids, Inc. v. FTC, 108 F Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1952).
'7 See Dunn, Wheeler-Lea Act 168, 432, 481 (1938); see also, S. Rep. No.
1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 221, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1937); 80 Cong. Rec. 6594 (1936) (Senator Wheeler); 83 Cong. Rec. 397
(1938) (Representative Reece). It is somewhat difficult to accept the suggested
parallel to the Packers & Stockyards Act of 1921 or to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. At the time, the former provided for finality of orders which were
not appealed, but had a far more stringent enforcement provision specifying fines
or imipnsonment for violation. 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 7 U.S.C. §195. The latter
at the time contained provisions for automatic finality in the absence of a petition
for court review, but had no provision for civil recovery by the United States for
violation of the order. See 48 Stat. 901 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78y (1958); 49 Stat.
1380 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §78 ff(b) (1958) (providing for civil penalties for
violations of the Securities Exchange Act or my rule or regulation issued there-
under).
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records are concerned they reveal nothing as to the origin of the
concept. 8
The next and possibly most confusing addendum to sub-section
(1) of section 5 was literally slipped into the statute twelve years
later. Dunng the course of the then two-year old debate on the
Oleomargarine Act of 1950, Senator Aiken became concerned
about possible advertising for colored margarine which might sug-
gest that it was a "dairy product." He feared that an order pro-
hibiting that type of margarine advertising might be violated with
impunity for an entire year, and yet the penalty for the violation
would be only a modest $5,000. Consequently, he offered on the
floor of the Senate a further addition to section 5 (1) which read:
Each separate violation of such an order shall be a separate
offense, except that in the case of a violation through con-
tinuing failure or neglect to obey a final order of the Com-
mission each day of continuance of such failure or neglect
shall be deemed a separate offense. 19
18 Availing itself of the authority to submit "recommendations for additional
legislation" granted m §6(f) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Com-
mission bad first recommended in its annual report, 1935 (pp. 14-16), an amend-
ment to the review and enforcement proceedings of §5. Basing its recommenda-
tions upon the "interest of simplicity and uniformity of enforcement procedure,"
the Commission proposed that §5 be amended so that it should be unnecessary
for the Commission "to establish a violation of its orders issued under §5 as a
condition precedent to obtmmng the court review provided for and to prov de
that when the Commission s order is affirmed the court shall thereupon issue its
own order commanding obedience to the order of the Commission." This was the
familiar "three bites at the apple" argument.
A further recommendation was made m this 1935 request m which the
Commission expressed the desire that "if a respondent does not take advantage of
the opportunity for court review within 60 days after issuance of the Commission s
order, the order shall become final and conclusive and the court may punish
violation thereof as a contempt of court." 1935 FTC Ann. Rep. 15. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In its annual report, 1936, the Commission renewed its recommendations "in
the interest of expedition and consistency m enforcement of its orders "
1936 FTC Ann. Rep). 17. The appeal was reiterated m the 1987 report, the
Comirssion noting that its recommendations were incorporated "in substance"
within S. 1077 [introduced by Senator Wheeler on Jan. 22, 1937] which had at
that time been passed by the Senate and had received a favorable report by the
appropnate House Committee. 1937 FTC Ann. Rep. 15. The 1938 report con-
tamed the text of the amendments to §5, the Commission stating that it had
"recommended the amendments now incorporated in its act which strengthen its
power in cases brought under that act " 1938 FTC Ann. Rep. 4. The
recollection of those still extant in and out of the Commssion is that the idea of
civil penalties was first advanced by the late Richard Whitely of the Commission
staff.
19 96 Cong. Rec. 333 (1950). Later Senator Fufibright expressed some
difficulty with this drafting, but agreed to take the problem to conference. After
the conference was under way, one Con essman received a telegram from a
constituent objecting to the new penalty language as confusing to businessmen
and terming it a "dangerous increase in bureaucratic police power." 96 Cong.
Rec. 2742 (1950). This was the first of a barrage of protests.
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No senator would countenance misleading advertising on oleo-
margarine, but everyone appeared to be equally oblivious to the
possible impact of the suggested language on all other Commission
orders. The addition was casually adopted by the Senate.
In the Conference Report, the change in the civil penalty pro-
vision was merely noted in passing. But by the time the debate
on that report began in the House, the new provision for section
5(1), caustically referred to as "the sleeper," had aroused a vast
amount of objection. This centered on the absence of any hearings
on the proposal and the impropriety of its inclusion in the par-
ticular legislation.
By this time, however, the Trade Commission itself had been
drawn into the controversy, and sought to justify the Aiken amend-
ment. Its Chief of Compliance wrote urging that the increased
penalties were only discretionary, and that the new language was
"'a common statutory provision." Its General Counsel, in writing
to the House Committee, argued that the provision made no
change in the existing law In his view of the original penalty
provision enacted in 1938, each appearance of a false advertisement
was a separate violation. He recognized that the "maximum
penalty would run into millions of dollars.120 But to soothe the
troubled waters, he added:
The Commission has never recommended to the Attorney
General, and the Attorney General has never sued for any
such astronomical sums, and it i% inconceivable to me that
any Federal court would impose penalties under this Section
which are not reasonably related both to the senousness of
the offense charged and the size and resources of the de
fendant. 96 Cong. Rec. 2974 (1950).
Whether discretionary civil penalties, leaving it to a judge to charge
whatever the traffic might bear, was a desirable sanction was never
debated.
2 oAfter considerable strain, an effective supporting illustration was also
developed: Judge Kelley admitted that as the law stood each radio broadcast of
a false advertisement of oleomargarine would be a separate violation. But he
offered the further example of a highway billboard which was left in place over
a penod of time and as to which the government would be limited to a single
$5,000 penalty. Whether the billboard would be in "commerce" within the mean-
mg of the act was never considered. Cf. Fisher s Blend Station, Inc. v. Tax
Comm n of Waslungton, 297 U.S. 650, 655 (1936). See also Pantomimic Corp.
v. Malone, 238 Fed. 135 (2d Cir. 1916). *
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Nevertheless, candor required the further comment to Congress
by the Commission General Counsel that "the principal value of
the amendment to the Commission would be in the field of price
fixing and continuing conspiracies in restraint of trade."
21.
Of course, this had nothing to do with oleomargarine advertis-
ing, but after a somewhat desultory debate as to whether what was
good for the dairy industry was also good for the rest of the nation,
the Conference Report was adopted by the House.
On the Senate side, it was frankly admitted in the debate that
the change had been made without thinking about anything other
than oleomargarine. But here the defense focused on why those
who would deliberately violate a Commission order should even
be the subject of senatonal concern, inasmuch as they did so,
with their eyes open when they cannot any longer be sur-
pnsed, and cannot any longer be unaware about what they
are authonzed to do or not to do, by a final order of the
Federal Trade Commission.22
Once again the threatening prospect of "billboards showing a
beautiful dairy farm scene" with contented cows and attractive
milk-maids, for the false advertising of margarine, carried the day
Each violation of any Commission order under section 5 became
a separate offense with the addition, somewhat strangely stated as
an exception, that "for continuing failure or neglect" to obey, each
day of continuance was also to be a separate basis for a $5,000
penalty 2
3
The Commission discomfort with cease and desist orders that
permitted respondents "three bites at the apple" continued as to
2 1 Attention was called to the fact that a continuing conspiracy was but one
substantive offense. The new language, it was urged, would "permit, but not
require, the Federal courts to impose penalties consummate with the offense and
more reasonably related to the advantages accrued to the defendants from the
violation." 96 Cong. Rec. 2974 (1950).
2296 Cong. Ree. 3019 (1950). As indicated m the quotation at the
beginning of this section, Senator Wiley was refreshingly forthright in admitting
that the amendment to §5(1) bad been a sleeper. In the concluding stages of the
debate, however, Senator Aiken insisted that the amendment had not been a
"sleeper" Instead, he reported that he had in fact requested the FTC to draft
it to cover both potential misrepresentations of oleomargarine and of the maple
syrup produced in his native state. As to the former, he wanted protection
against the billboard showing "guernsey cows in the foreground and a good-
loolang girl with a milk pail on her arm" for the advertising of oleomargarine.
Id. at 8025.2 3 As to the fitting of tis language to particular cases, see cases cited note 96
inlra.
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orders authonzed by section 11 of the Clayton Act. Its pain was
intensified by the Ruberoid decision24 in which the Supreme Court,
relying on the obvious differences between section 11 of the
Clayton Act and the -Wheeler-Lea amendments of 1938 to section
5 of the Trade Commission Act, made it clear that no order of
enforcement would be entered absent a showing of actual or
imminent violation, even where the reviewing court was immedi-
ately willing to affirm the Commission order. Repeatedly, in its
annual reports,25 the Commission urged Congress to make com-
parable amendments to section 11.
Beginning in 1955, bills were introduced that eventually cul-
minated in the Finality Act of July 23, 1959 But in the hearings
and debates on that enactment, the issues were sharply drawn.26
The opponents relied pnncipally upon the vaganes of the Robinson-
Patman Act when compounded by the use of cease and desist
orders drawn in the foggy words of that statute. Great reliance was
placed upon the dissenting opinion in Ruberoid, in its charactenza-
ton of the Commission order as literally forbidding what the Act
expressly allows, and upon the Morton Salt2 7 determination that a
Commission order ought not leave a respondent at large as to its
application.
On its part, the Commission insisted that discussions of order
finality and of penalty ought for disobedience not to be confused
with the problems of drafting appropnate orders.28  The Con-
gressional debates suggest that this administrative reluctance to
consider that the punishment was in any way related to the cnme
proved persuasive.
Yet in a final plaintive plea, the Senate Committee twice ex-
pressed its "hopes that the agencies affected by this proposed
legislation will continue their efforts to issue orders which are as
24 TC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
25 1951 FTC Ann. Rep. 7-8; 1952 FTC Ann. Rep. 3. See also, Kelley, Should
the Law of Section 2 Be Revised? 1948 CCH Antitrust Law Symposium 114.26 The American Bar Association by formal resolution vigorously opposed the
change as did a number of state and regional bar associations. Hearings Before
the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 93, 96 (Finality of Clayton Act orders) (1959); Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the
judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (Legislation Affecting §§7, 11, and 15 of the
Clayton Act) (1958).
27 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
28 Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on
fhe Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (Finality of Clayton Act orders) (1959).
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definitive as possible."2 On its part, the House Committee found
unappealing the objection that past cease and desist orders under
the Clayton Act were vague and uncertain, but somewhat more
catagorically announced:
The Committee intends that the Commissions and boards
affected by the bill will make a continuous effort to issue
orders that are as definitive as possible.30
These statements were amplified on the floor by a member of
the House Committee, in a further expression of hope.
The difficulty pointed out by the Amencan Bar Association
in its statement is that Federal Trade Commission cease and
desist orders with respect to pnce discnmination are couched
in such broad, general terms that sometimes they are almost
the equivalent of using the statutory language. If the Federal
Trade Commission made its cease and desist orders more
specific, rather than just to prohibit some general line of
conduct, I believe there probably would be less objection to
making their orders final, giving use to a cause of action
with a penalty of $5,000 a day. That is a very severe penalty,
I may point out, particularly when language is so broad that
reasonable men may get different meanings out of it.
I express the hope that the Federal Trade Commission
will seek to make its cease and desist orders more specific,
clearer, so that there cannot be, as there is today, as broad an
area of possible disagreement as to what constitutes com-
pliance with its orders. (Emphasis added) 105 Cong. Rec.
12734 (1959).
Although Congressional hopes may spnng eternal, we shall later
consider whether they have thus far been realized and whether
they are likely to be gratified in the future.
Two remaining curiosities in the Congressional consideration
of the 1959 Finality Act warrant at least passing comment.
In the Wheeler-Lea amendment in 1938 it had been made
explicitly clear that the new provisions applied to all outstanding
cease and desist orders under section 5.31 But through incredible
29S. Rep. No. 83, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959).30 H.R. Rep. No. 580, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1959). See also, 105 Cong.
Rec. 12735 (1959) (remarks of Congressman Celler).31 Section 5 of that enactment gave every respondent under an outstanding
cease and desist order an additional sixty days within which to determine whether
to go to the Court of Appeals or to have is outstanding order become finally
effective, with future violation subject to civil penalties.
1963]
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inadvertence, section 2 of the Finality Act was lcft wholly unclear
as to retroactivity Five days after its enactncnt, however, the
Federal Trade Commission by a press rclcase attempted to decide
the question. It offered what the statute had failed to provide-an
additional sixty days after enactment within which to petition for
court review on all outstanding Clayton Act cease and desist orders
or to permit them to become final.
Extensive legal debate on whether the Commission could by
press release do what Congress had either failed or not intended to
do, culminated in litigation which ultimately settled the question.
It may now be taken as established that the 1959 Finality Act does
not apply to orders entered before July 23, 1959 '2
The second curiosity is that in the 1959 debates it was re-
peatedly suggested that the civil penalty provisions were needed,
and would be singularly appropriate, in the enforcement of orders
in merger cases under section 7 of the Clayton Act. As will be
later developed, there may be room for extensive argument as to
when a Commission cease and desist order as now formulated, is
truly "final" either for court review or for penalty action.3
To summarize the enforcement structure applicable after 1959
to Trade Commission orders under both statutes:
3 2 Sperry Rand Corp. v. FTC, 288 F.2d 403 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Schick, Inc.
v. FTC, 288 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1961); FTC v. Nash-Finch Co., 288 F.2d 407
(D.C. Cir. 1961). For a contemporary summary of the arguments concerning
retroactivity, see Simon, The Retroactivity of Amended Section 11 of the Clayton
Act, 1960 CCH Antitrust Law Symposium 85. See also FTC v. Henry Broch & Co.,
366 U.S. 360, 365 n. 5 (1962).
Section 2 of the Finality Act expressly exempted from its application all
orders involved in review or enforcement proceedings in the courts of appeals at
the time of enactment. It appears, however, that the Commission expects the new
procedure to govern in cases instituted by the Commission before July 23, 1959,
as long as the order was issued after that date. See e.g., Hearst Corp., No. 7391,
FTC News Release, June 12, 1962 (Complaint issued Feb. 5, 1959; order on June
30, 1960; suit for penalties instituted June 11, 1962, m the Southern District of
New York).
33 In the course of the Supreme Court's consideration of Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), Justice Harlan suggested that because the
District Court's order of divestiture contained no specific plan for implementing
the dissolution, there might be no final order from which appeal couldbe taken.
After both sides submitted briefs in support of the finality of the order the
majority found that the order was "final within the meanmg of the Expeiting
Act, 32 Stat. 823 (1903), 15 U.S.C. §29 (1958). The Chief Justice gave as
reasons for fis result: (1) the Government's complaint was fully disposed of,
leaving only the approval of submitted plans to future court action, (2) a
divestiture order necessarily involved lengthy negotiation and compromise which
might be hampered by the uncertainty attending the disallowance of immediate
appeal, and (3) though it had never expressly passed on the issue, the Supreme
Court had previously followed the practice of permitting appeal from such orders.
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If the respondent does not seek court review, the orders become
automatically final after sixty days, and the only method of enforce-
ment open to the government is a civil penalty suit.
If the respondent seeks court review, the Commission can ob-
tain an enforcement order at the same time that it secured affirm-
ance of its cease and desist order. In these circumstances, the
Commission has a double-barreled enforcement weapon: It can
proceed by a contempt action, or it can pursue the civil penalty
route.
34
At least two questions may be ventured about the ultimate
enforcement edifice thus erected. It might be argued that the
possibility of ending up with a double-barreled enforcement pro-
cedure against him might serve to deter a respondent from seeking
court review of a Commission order. Even more interesting is why
the Commission, or the legislative draftsmen, did not provide that
an order which became final, because no petition to review was
filed within sixty days, might nevertheless have been made enforce-
able by some judicial action analogous to contempt.3 5 This is what
the Commission had originally suggested in 1936.
What appears to be clear as a matter of history is that the
original introduction of the concept of an expansive monetary
penalty for violation of an administrative order, denominated both
a forfeiture and a civil penalty, was originally introduced in 1938
and expanded in 1950 in an extraordinarily casual fashion 6 before
being extended to the Clayton Act in 1959 over vigorous and
pointed objections.
III
Civil Penalties zn Action-1938-61
The issuance of Commission orders phrased in general and
in definite statutory language seems to me to achieve little
beyond the imposition of a set of obscure ad hoc prohibitions
carrying heavy penalties for their violation. To be sure, no
fine or penalty is imposed for a violation of the statute that
34 Whether the Commission can seek both types of punishment for the
same violation has never been determined.
35See pp. 524-25 infra.
36 See note 18 supra. There is also a very early federal statute of limitations,
dating from 1839 for suits to recover penalties. This requires suit to be brought
within five years. 28 U.S.C., §2462 (1958). No case has been found in which
tis limitation was applied in a civil penalty action under §5(1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. See also, Helverin v. Mitchell, 803 U.S. 891, 401
(1938).
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occurs before entry of an order. It need not and should
not be a sword of Damocles suspended above his head,
poised to fall with devastating effect whenever and however
he should again stray." Commissioner Elman in The Quaker
Oats Company, No. 8119, FTC, April 25, 1962.
The wide differences in attractiveness to the Commission
between the present finality provisions and the earlier "three bites"
is graphically illustrated by the relative number of times sanctions
have been invoked under the two procedures. At the time of the
hearings on the 1959 Finality Act only five contempt proceedings
had been brought against Clayton Act violators, while the number
of penalty actions under section 5 orders in the twenty-one years
of Wheeler-Lea had reached sixty-four.37
The largest single penalty exacted up to 1959 had been $38,000
for violation of an order in a price-fixing case, and relatively few
penalties had exceeded $5,000. Although a 1960 contempt pro-
ceeding has nudged the record up to $60,000, no sum for violation
of a Commission order has yet begun to plumb the potential depths
of the daily penalty provision.38
It appears, however, that the Commission is no longer to be
appeased by these relatively small sums, for suit has recently been
instituted for $185,000 for thirty-seven alleged violations of an
advertising order, and $75,000 and $110,000 penalties have been
asked for Robinson-Patman violations.3 9
The Commission invariably demands in its complaint the
maximum $5,000 for each of the alleged violations, but in no case
has the full recovery been granted. Because the amount of the
penalty is said to be within the discretion of the court, the pay-off
in dollars is usually a function of the respondents financial resources
and the disclosed willfulness of the violation. 0
The sympathy which courts manifest for the respondent labor-
37 Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-31 (1959) (Bills to amend §11 of the
Clayton Act).
38 All penalty actions are listed in the FTC Annual Report for the following
year.
30 Coty, Inc., FiC News Release, Jan. 19, 1962; Time. Inc., FTC News
Release, April 4, 1962; Hearst Pub. Co., FTC News Release, June 12, 1962.
40 See e.g., United States v. Home Diathermy Co., 1960 CCH Trade Cas.,
1169,601 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ($100 for each of the first four counts, $50 for each of
the next twelve, for a total penalty of $1,000 for sixteen violations); Wilson
Chemical Co., (W.D. Pa., Oct. 4, 1962) ($5,000 on each of nine violations found
wilful).
[Vol. 51,
FIVE THOUSAND DOLLAMS A DAY
Ing under these potentially ruinous penalties is well illustrated by
United States v Amencan Greetings Corp.1 in which the Govern-
ment requested $40,000 for eight asserted violations of a section 5
order. In its compliance report the respondent had disclosed the
practice which was alleged as the basis of three of the eight counts
and the Commission had not objected. Although the court agreed
that estoppel will not arise against the Government, it awarded
only $200 on each of these three counts, and $2,000 for each of
the other five.
Few of the many substantive and procedural questions lurking
in the use of civil penalty actions have yet been raised. Their
potential scope and complexity will be later examined.
To date only the narrow issue has been considered under
advertising orders as to what is for the court to determine and
what is for the jury to decide. The Commission urges that the
question of the meaning of an advertisement alleged to violate an
order is an issue for the court alone. This position presumably
rests on the theory that the only question in a penalty action is
whether the order has been violated. It is advanced in concert
with the argument that the violation presents only a question of
"law" for the court. The Commission conclusion is that the jury
should be concerned only with ascertaining what the respondent
did, not whether that conduct violated the order. United States v
Piuma4d 2 is usually cited as the basis for this theory, which was
recently swallowed in a gratuitous footnote dictum by the Third
Circuit.
4 1
But careful analysis of Piuma readily reveals that these decisions
turned on nothing more than the rather conventional concept that
on a motion for summary judgment the court may decide the case
where no real issue of fact is presented for decision.44 The plem-
41 168 F Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1958), new trial dented, 1959 CCH Trade
Cas. 169,289 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd, 272 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1959). The court,
referring to its "great discretion" in the assessment of penalties, cited the
respondent's fifteen years of compliance as a mitigating factor.
4240 F Supp. 119 (E.D. Cal. 1941), aff'd, 126 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1942).
43 In United States v. Vulcamzed Rubber & Plastics Co., 288 F.2d 257, 258
n.2 (3d Cir. 1961) cert, dened, 368 U.S. 821 (1961), the court termed erroneous
the submission to die jury, in another case, of the question of the meaning of the
phrase used in an advertisement. United States v. Hindman, 179 F Supp. 926
(D.N.J. 1960).
44 See United States v. Home Diathermy Co., 1960 CCH Trade Cas. 69,601
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) - "We find no triable issue of fact in this case and grant plain-
tiff's (the Unite~d States'] motion for summary judgment:'
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tude of fact issues that can anse for determination in civil penalty
actions will be explicated after the intncacies of Commission order
writing have been examined.
IV
Coverage in Breadth, Depth, and Ambiguity
Though some may argue to the contrary, we do not
view the narrow language of the Broch decision as justifica-
tion for couching orders, either in broad or detailed language,
which endeavor to define what respondents may do or must
do in order to comply with the statute. We believe our
present compliance procedures to be adequate. We recog-
nize an obligation to tell the respondents, with as much
specificity as possible, what they must stop doing. However,
to suggest that a cease and desist order is an appropnate
vehicle to gratuitously guide or instruct businessmen as to
what they may do and must do, we firmly believe is beyond
our province. Government regulation has not yet, and we
hope never will, become a substitute for corporate manage-
ment. Amencan business, so we believe, should by and large,
be left free to adopt its own methods of operation. The free
enterprise system should remain, in fact, free and inde-
pendent; shackled not by a bumptious bureaucracy-but re-
strained solely and effectively by fair enforcement of the laws
enacted by the Congress. We do not regard the Broch case
or any pnor decision of the highest court, as a command to
take over, even in part, corporate direction and control. Sug-
gestions of this character, we believe, only scrvc to debase the
Administrative Process." Commissioner Kem in The Quaker
Oats Company, No. 8119, FTC, April 25, 1962.
Any value judgment as to the desirability or efficacy of a penalty
necessarily turns upon an examination of the scope, clarity, and
specificity of the prohibitory order. There are analogous base lines.
Where criminal penalties are exacted, constitutional limitations
demand specifics and not generalities.4" Even as to civil suits for a
statutory violation, the Supreme Court has invalidated "the ex-
action of obedience to a rule or standard which was so vague and
indefinite as really to bc no rule or standard at all."
'46
15 United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921) ($5,000 fine, or
two-year imprisonment). Cf. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1947). The con-
stitutionality of §3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is now being examined m United
States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., No. 173, Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1961.
46 A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239-40
(1925). In Standard Chemicals & Metals Corp. v. Waugh, 231 N.Y. 51, 54, 131
(Continued on next page)
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No different rule should apply where punishments, even though
denominated civil penalties, can reach the astronomical proportions
possible under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and
section 11 of the Clayton Act. As has been seen, the most salient
objection to the 1959 Finality Act (and certainly the most cogent
argument against its asserted retroactivity) was the existence of
earlier Commission cease and desist orders, particularly under the
Robinson-Patman Act, which were so vague and indefinite that
the retroactive exaction of civil penalties for non-compliance would
make for a truly hazardous existence for most respondents. Any
fully detailed examination as to whether that charge was histoncally
true would be vastly beyond the range of this essay
But no fair evaluation of Commission order writing, past or pres-
ent, can be made without refinement of analysis that searches into
the clarity or obscurity of the underlying statutes. A cease and
desist order is the culmination of a Commission proceeding. The
order rests upon proof of a complaint which, in theory at least,
relates to the form and content of the statutory proscnption.
It may be no compelling defense for ambiguous Commission
orders, but it is at least a minimum exculpation, to point to the
turgidity of the congressional directives given the Commission.
The concept of "any unfair method of competition or unfair or
deceptive act or practice in commerce" is perhaps as indefinite as it
is expansible. To lambast the drafting of the Robinson-Patman Act
would be intellectually beating a well-lacerated horse; and every
antitrust lawyer is still much at sea as to the quantitative as well as
to the qualitative content of that elusive and fee-producing phrase,
"to substantially lessen competition", ungrammatically introduced
in 1914 into sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act.
At best, the task of drafting orders to proscribe future violations
of these imprecise statutory provisions demands penetrating analy-
tical skill, imaginative drafting, and, cardinally, the avoidance of
that semantic stare deczs that characterizes every lawyer's affection
for form books.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
N.E. 566, 567 (1921) (Cardozo, J.), the New York Court of Appeals observed
that a "prohibition so indefinite as to be unintelligible is not a prohibition by which
conduct can be governed."
Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, denved from 28 U.S.C.
§383 1958), specifies that "every restraining order shall be specific in terms;
shall describe in reasonable detail the act or acts sought to be restrained.
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But almost five decades of Commission effort and experience
discloses perhaps too little of these needed talents or true ex-
pertise. History often repeats itself. Those who have over the
years drafted Commission orders have inevitably repeated each
other. Prolix obscure provisions that were readily accepted by the
Commission in one prototype case soon became encrusted in rigid
boilerplate to be required for all similar and often for unrelated
proceedings. The desire to comprehend every future possible viola-
ton led to divergent tendencies: either to repetitive statements of
general prohibitions in terms of conduct "having a tendency or
capacity" to achieve the prohibited end, or to the easier technique
of phrasing the prohibition merely in the formal, even though
obscure, language of the statute.
If the congressional admonitions at the time of the 1959
Finality Act-and the fact that the kind of order writing that
preceded it was the strongest argument against retroactivity-are to
be reflected in the drafting of future Commission orders, continued
adherence to obscure, prolix, and repetitive boilerplate ought to be
discontinued.
Uncertainty perhaps also underlies the past and continued use
of tautology, exemplified in the now familiar impounding of un-
lawful agreement in the phrase,
entenng into, continuing, cooperating in, or carrying out any
planned common course of action, understanding, agreement,
combination, or conspiracy between and among any two or
more of said respondents, or between any one or more of
said respondents and others not parties hereto. 48
47Conventionally, the use of this term to characterize the institutional experi-
ence of an administrative agency is attributed to-Mr. Justice Frankfurter. In fact,
the term has older and somewhat different sources. See Webster s International
Dictionary, Third Edition. Paradoxically, what appears to be the first use by the
then Professor Frankfurter of the term in relation to adimmstrative agencies was a
lament that the needed expertise resided more in the pnvate bar than in the
agency staffs. See Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government 113 (1930). It
appears that prior to this time, the courts never employed the term in describing
the discretion conferred upon the Commission even where it was pioneermg. See
e.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (Mr. Justice Day).48 As the reviewing courts made clear, this meant simply any action by
agreement between any one of the respondents and anyone else, in short, a
conspiracy. Mr. Justice Black commented on the quoted order preamble: "The
objection is twofold; first, that it adds nothing to the words that immediately
follow it; and second that if it does add anything, 'the Commission should be
reqmred to state what this novel phrase [planned common course of action] means
in tis order and what it adds to the four words [understanding or agreement,
combination or conspiracy]. It seems quite clear to us what the phrase means.
(Continued on next page)
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Too often, also, at least in the earlier days, the basic order was
formulated initially to cover everything, and then had appended
to it a necessary series of provisos to except what was plainly lawful
conduct otherwise covered.
When challenged on review, this kind of dragnet drafting was
always defended by a series of cliches. That the "Commission
[could not] be required to confine its road black to the narrow lane
the transgressor has traveled; it must be allowed effectively to close
all roads to the prohibited goal; ' 49 that the "Commission has wide
discretion in its choice of a remedy determined adequate to cope
with the unlawful practices;" 50 and that what had once been
administratively determined to be unlawful ought not to be open
to relitigation.
Of course, where a reviewing court wanted to modify or to
remand, even while affirming the finding of violation on the par-
ticular acts, it was seldom inhibited. Most Commission orders at
least up to the determinative dates of 1938 and 1959 were not
appealed. For those entered by consent, court review was fore-
closed. Desultory compliance activity, engendered in considerable
measure by the paucity of budgets, and the pre-Finality Act system
of "two additional bites of the apple," alike contributed to paper
orders whose sweeping coverage and foggy contours were for
practical purposes never put to the test.
It would be an endless and futile task to examine all of the
vagaries in drafting that have been pursued over the years and today
are being presistently followed. A few highlights, necessarily
catalogued under the key statutory provisions will suffice to demon-
strate the problem. They may also serve to evoke sympathy for
those who have had to pioneer in writing orders, even if at the
same time they disclose why some orders were never enforced,
and why the mechanical exaction of penalties for every separate
violation of what they purported to cover might have been an
economic calamity More important, even a bnef recital may offer
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
It is merely an emphatic statement that the Commission is prohibiting concerted
action-planned concerted action." FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 728
(1948). See also Amencan Chain & Cable Co. v. FTC, 139 F.2d 622 (4th Cir.
1944); Amiencan Iron & Steel Institute, 48 F.T.C. 123, 154 (1951).4 9 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
50 Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611 (1946); Niresk Indus., Inc. v.
FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 883 (1960) ("or to
reach identical illegal practices.")
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balance in the current arguments about what should be the criteria
in achieving a responsive order.
Historically, the enforcement of section 5 yielded orders m two
rather different areas: hard core Sherman Act violations, and those
unfair methods of competition which involved fraud or decep-
tion.51 The preoccupation of the Commission with more easily
proved hard core Sherman Act violations has occasionally been
noted. 2 Essentially, in the resulting orders, the respondents were
to be told to cease and desist from price fixing. To this injunction
there might have been added a "directly or indirectly" to compre-
hend tacit conspiracies and whatever a court might make out of
evidence of "conscious parallel action. ' 53 But typically, the cease
and desist order in a Sherman Act type of case was extensive,
repetitive, and sought to describe every type of unlawful pnce or
market conduct that might add up to conspiracy 
5 4
Much has also been written about the addendum to the Com-
mission conspiracy order in National Lead which sought to pro-
hibit the use of zone pricing by the individual participants to the
conspiracy 55 Even though given judicial blessing by the Supreme
Court, there are few who even today are astute enough to tell what
in reality it prohibits.
Perhaps the ultimate development of dragnet order writing in
the field of conspiracy is a recent consent order58 which occupies
ten pages in the course of which the respondents are prohibited
from basic price fixing and thirteen other specific forms of pnce
fixing adumbrated in the complaint. This section of the order is so
broad that a further proviso is necessary to permit
51 This same dichotomy is perhaps preserved m the current division between
the Bureau of Antimonopoly and the Bureau of Deceptive Practices. Of course,
the former now comprehends all Clayton Act violations, and the latter s junsdiction
was expanded by §§12-15 of the Wheeler-Lea Act.
s Auster, supra note 11.
53 See Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
587 (1954).
5Ina typical order, which became virtually reqmred broilerplate, there were
thirteen separate paragraphs detailing types o pr bited conduct, and then a
paragraph which or good measure prohibited anything listed mn the first thirteen.
See Amnencan Refractories Inst., 44 F.T.C. 773, 828-31 (1938).
55FTC v. National Lead Co., 852 U.S. 419 (1957). Kirkham, Problems of
Conspiracy, 1958 CCH Antitrust Law Symposium 21, 28-29. But cf. Kintner, The
Ten Leading Antitrust-Federal Trade Commisswn Cases, 3 Antitrust Bull. 607,
623-2.5 (1958).
56 The Rubber Mfr s Ass n, No. 7505, FTC, Jan. 5, 1962 (approved under its
earlier procedure).
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carrying out in good faith a contract to manufacture or to
sell to or buy from any bona fide customer or supplier,
wlhether such customer or supplier is or is not a respondent
herein.
A further section requires each of the conspirators independently
to revise his prices, and not to change them for six months unless
he has to meet a competitive situation." A further section pro-
hibits disseminating price information to competitors before it is
given to the public. There are other detailed provisions in this
massive order covering the activities of the respondent trade as-
sociation.
On the other hand, when the Commission got away from hard
core violations and endeavored to carry out its statutory mandate to
foreclose potential Sherman Act violations in their incipiency, it
usually did better, as the pioneering Beech-Nut order demon-
strates. .5 8
Following the Wheclcr-Lea Act and its emancipation from the
confines of Raladam,9 the Commission's activities in other areas
covered by section 5 of its own statute rapidly broadened. In the
area of "free goods" its oscillations as to what is covered by the
statute were always reflected in its writing of orders.00 This ad-
ministrative struggle, both substantively and as to order writing,
recently culminated in Commissioner Elman's observing in a dis-
sent that he could not possibly tell what respondents must "stop
doing what they are now doing." 61
57 Ibzd. This order has a further addendum specifying that "the respondent
making such change shall have the burden of establishing that such change was
made in good faith to meet a competitive pricing situation." Query: Is this
intended to have the effect of changing the burden of proof in any subsequent
civil penalties action? Cf. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
58 FTC v. Beech-Nut Packaging Co., 257 U.S. 441, 444 (1922). But see note
83 infra.
5gFTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931). See also Austern, The
Parentage and Administrative Ontogeny of the Federal Tarde Commission, 1955
CCH Antitrust Law Symposium 83.
00 Compare Walter J. Black, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 225 (1953), with Book-ofthe-
Month Club, Inc., 48 F.T.C. 1297 (1952).
61 Mary Carter Paint Co., No. 8290, FTC, June 28, 1962. Commissioner
Elman lamented his inability, as to the first part of the order to determine "what
effect does it really have, and how are respondents to comply with it I confess I
do not know." He continued: "Paragraph '(b)' is almost as puzzling. Pre-
sumably, it is intended to reqmre respondents to cease advertising Buy 1 and get
1 Free. But this cannot be deduced from anything to be found in the terms of
the order. As the Commissions own troubles with the problem show, the
(Continued on next page)
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In another line of cases involving the use of deceptive company
names, trade names or trademarks, the Commission has undoubt-
edly exercised a broad discretion as to the bite of its order,62 but
the criteria that determine whether there is to be a complete ban
on continuance or merely a required disclaimer that negatives
deception, remain wholly elusive.
63
In the field of advertising, covered both by section 5 and its
statutory progeny, sections 12 and 15, the development of cease
and desist orders has had its own history After an initial defeat in
Alberty,64 the Commission has now launched into an effort to
convert many of its orders from cease and desist prohibitions into
affirmative requirements. The general format is that if the adver-
tser makes a particular claim, he must in turn append to it one or
more disclaimers. If the product is advertised as useful for baldness,
the advertiser must at the same time affirmatively point out that
for only five per cent of those afflicted with baldness will the
remedy be effective.6"
Another area of development in these advertising cases has been
the coverage of the order. Typically, the early orders related to the
specific product "or any other product of substantially the same
composition." This technique at the very least left open for argu-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
definition of 'free merchandise is no easy matter. Yet respondents are ordered,
on pame of heavy penalties, to cease and desist from describing merchandise as
free when such is not the fact. Surely, tis provision, like paragraph '(a)' is
indefensibly vague, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's recent call for
Commission orders sufficiently clear and precise to avoid raising senous questions
as to their meaning and application. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360,
368 (1962)."
62Bakers Franchise Corp., No. 7472, FTC, 1961, aff'd, 802 F.2d 258 (3d
Cir. 1962); Elliot Knitwear Inc. v. FTC, 266 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959); Perloff
v. FTC, 150 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1945); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d
751 (3d Cir. 1944), revd, 327 U.S. 608 (1946); Charles of the Ritz Distrib.
Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944); Allen B. Wnsley Co. v. FTC, 113
F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1940); FTC v. Royal Milling Co.. 288 U.S. 212 (1933); Royal
Baking Powder Co. v. FTC 281 Fed. 744 2d Cir. 1922).
63 After ordering discontinuance of United States in United States Ass n
of Credit Bureaus Inc., No. 7043, FTC, June 8, 1961, the Commission realized
that requirement in a consent order in a virtually similar case, United States Credit
Rating Bureau, Inc., No. C-71, FTC, Feb. 8, 1962, only six days before its order
in the first case was unanimously affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. United States
Assn of Credit Bureaus, Inc. v. FTC. 299 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1962).6 4 Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818
(1950).
65 Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960);
Ward Labs., Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
827 (1960). See also Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960) (bed-wetting).
Cf. Mohawk Refining Corp. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 814 (1959) (re-used oil).
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ment in a compliance proceeding whether two products were of
similar composition. In other cases generic equivalence was speci-
ficd in terms of the "X margarine or any other margarine."
Recently, order coverage has extended to whole categories of prod-
ucts such as "cosmetics and drugs."
By and large what has been prohibited in the advertising cases
has been tailored to the claims made and deemed to have been
false or misleading."' Yet inescapably the contest between the
copywriter's creative ingenuity and the Commission's insistence
that it alone can determine the implied message in words, pictures,
or combinations of both ii television advertising, forecasts expand-
mg and probably hard-fought compliance litigation. Even though
the Commission may in its own proceedings insist that an advertise-
ment means what the Commission says it means, whether that
type of zpse dixit will prevail in the collection of civil penalties
remains to be seen.
In this dynamic area of Commission activity, the final develop-
ment has been the naming in a single complaint not only of the
advertiser but also of the advertising agency, and the culmination
in a cease and desist order applying to all products manufactured
by the advertiser and all products advertised by the agency The
prohibitions in these recent orders are set forth in terms whose
vagueness is matched only by their endless coverage, ranging
through printing, photography, television in black and white as
well as color, and the use of what are called stage-props." How far
the courts will countenance this type of omnibus scope and cover-
age remains to be seen.
To detail the wandering trail in the drafting of orders under the
various sections of the Robinson-Patman Act and the challenges
66 But the orders on the false advertising of oleomargarine, each verbosely
prohibiting in the exact words of the statute any representation "that margarine
is a dairy product," leave the respondent wholly to his own devices to ascertain
the content of the prohibitions of §15 of the Oleomargarine Act, 52 Stat. 114
(1938), 15 U.S.C. §55(a)(2) (1958). See e.g., E. F Drew & Co., 51 F.T.C.
1056 (1955), modified, 235 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1956); Reddi-Spred Corps., 51
F.T.C. 1074 (1955), modified, 229 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1956). Under such an
order the criminal penalties provided by 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §54
(1958), are supplemented by the equally severe civil penalty sanctions in §5(1)
without the benefit of either the constitutional protections of a criminal proceeding
or the desired precise formulation supposedly offered by a specific cease and
desist order.
67 Carter Prods., Inc., No. 7943, FTC, April 25, 1962; Colgate Palmolive Co.,
No. 7736, FTC, Dec. 29, 1961.
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which have been made to them is hardly necessary 68 The peaks of
confusion on section 2(a) orders are familiar to most lawyers. In
Morton Salt in 1948, the Supreme Court made it clear that no
price discrimination order could shift to the courts, in measuring
compliance, whether there was in fact compliance with that crystal
clear statute. But four years later in Ruberoid, the Court affirmed
a broad order-which as a prototype was thereafter baptized a
"Ruberold order"-on the ground that all statutory defenses are
available to the respondent in enforcement proceedings without
being spelled out in the order.69
Necessarily, this means that in compliance proceedings the
courts must rule on such fact issues as the existence of cost Iustifica-
tion, changes in marketing conditions, and the contours of the
meeting of competition defense. What seems beyond question is
that by use of the now conventional Ruberozd type of order much
of what the court sought to avoid in Morton Salt still remains open
on compliance.70
68 The full story is splendidly set forth in Rowe, Price Discrimination Under
the Robinson-Patman Act 504 et seq. (1962). For the colorful legal vocabulary
employed in characterizing the substantive provisions of the Act, see Austem,
Tabula in Naufragio-Admimstrative Style-Some Observations on the Robinson-
Patman Act, 1953 CCH Antitrust Law Symposium 105-06.
69FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 348 U.S. 470 (1952). The standard order, now
regularly employed, prohibits "selling such products of like grade and quality to
any purchaser at prices lower than those granted other purchasers who in fact
compete with the favored purchasers in the resale or distribution of such products."
Before the Supreme Court decision in Ruberozd, it was the Commissions
theory that in the event of a later change in facts, circumstance, or law, a
respondent subject to a §2(a) order would have to seek Commission modification
based on the change. This position rested on a misreading of Morton Salt, which
had involved upon the invalidity of a proviso which invited, but in no sense
authorized, a particular differential. It is often forgotten that the Morton Salt
order specifically authorized differentials which were cost-]ustified. For a
penetrating analysis of the impracticability of conducting business in a dynanuc
market under a rule of required prior application to the Commission, see Shmder-
man Federal Trade Commission Orders Under The Robnson-Patman Act: An
Argument for Limiting Their Impact on Subsequent Pricing Conduct, 65 Harv.
L. Rev 750 766 (1952). This study, which preceded the Supreme Court opinion
in Ruberod, made it clear that the real question was not whether provisos are
formally written into a cease and desist order, but what defenses might be
available in an enforcement proceeding.
70 Whether or not it is still open to a respondent to argue that a changed
pricing method does not violate an order because it does not affect competition
was considered in National Biscuit Co., 50 F.T.C. 932 (1954). In this proceeding,
an old order which prohibited price discrimination "except as permitted by section
2 of the Clayton Act" was changed to the Ruberoid form. But the Commission
carefully specified that "in the event of a definite change of circumstances" the
respondent was not "forever precluded from asserting one or more of the defenses
which were available to hmi durng the original proceeding " (The writer
was of counsel in thus proceeding.) Recent Commission dissents indicate some
discomfort with wooden application of Ruberold forms of orders. See American
Oil Co., No. 8183, FTC, 1962.
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Under section 2 (c) of the Clayton Act, the so-called brokerage
provisions which account for the predominant number of Robinson-
Patman Act proceedings, the Commission orders have been from
the beginning phrased merely in the words of the statute. On this
very section, the Supreme Court issued its plain directive in Broch.
In a proceeding involving a single transaction between a Canadian
seller to an American buyer, through an American broker, whose
legality under the statute required an initial decision by a divided
court,7 1 the Commission entered substantially its standard haec
verba order. On remand, the Seventh Circuit summarily limited
the order to future transactions between the particular seller and
the particular buyer.72 The Supreme Court affirmed again by
divided vote in a tortuous opinion 73 relying mainly on the ground
that the Finality Act did not cover the case. Its strictures about
order writing for the future are quoted at the opening of this paper.
Even more startling, the majority in a footnote apparently revital-
ized the phrase "for services rendered" which had in earlier lower
court opinions been virtually excised from section 2(c) 74
Nevertheless, the Commission still enters section 2(c) orders
in the words of the statute. The insistent theory is that section
2(c) is adequately particularized. There appears to be little or no
rcflection of the admonitions of the Supreme Court in Broch.
Judicial restiveness with the practice of general orders in the
words of the statute, following the 1959 Finality Act, was measur-
ably increased, notably in the Swanee, Grand Union, and American
News cases. 75 But despite the Supreme Court in Broch and the
Second and Third Circuits' reluctance to affirm broad orders, the
Commission has shown little sign of departing from the easy prac-
71 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).7 2 Henry Broch & Co. v. FTC, 285 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1960).
73 368 U.S. 360 (1962). Mr. Justice Brennan suggested that the respondent
was not incurnng any nsk of a contempt penalty, because when the Commission
applied for an enforcement order there could be "further administrative and
]udicial consideration and interpretation" at which time there might be some
"tailonng of the order" in the fitting of a specific asserted violation so as to meet
legitimate needs of the case. Id. at 866. He further suggested that Broch would
have the benefit of all statutory defenses or exceptions.
74 See Austern, Section 2(c), 1946 CCH Robinson-Patman Act Symposium 37,
39-42. If this turns out to be true, the Commission and those who have aggres-
sively sponsored §2(c) may have won a Pyrrhic victory in the Broch litigation.
7.,Swance Paper Corp. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961); Grand Union
v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962); Amencan News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104
(2d Cir. 1962); Bankers Security Corp. v. FTC, 297 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1961).
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tice of writing a Robmson-Patman Act order in the turgid phrases
of that enactment."8
Within the Commission the battle now rages in the area of
section 2 (d) orders. The majority seemingly will stick to its guns.17
In a series of closely reasoned dissents, Commissioner Elman has
been vigorously urging new approaches. In Vanity Fair Paper
Mills, he announced his basic concept: That while the Commission
had wide discretion in the choice of a remedy and presumably
special competence in formulating orders, a cease and desist order,
like a court decree, must be specific.
In his view, the Commission must proceed under three operat-
ing rules. First, it must determine whether an order should be
limited, as in Swanee and American News, to the particular acts
or practices found illegal, or more broadly, cover like and related
practices. Second, whether the Commission writes a broad or
narrow order, it is under a duty to spell out in a reasoned and
explicit opinion its reasons for the remedy selected. In Commis-
sioner Elman's view,
The practice of entenng broad orders in the terms of the
statute, routinely and automatically, without citing need or
justification therefor, is indefensible as a matter of law and
sound administration. Respondents, Commission Coun-
sel, reviewing courts, the bar, and the business community
have as much nght to, and as great a need for, an explanation
of the reasons for the remedy selected as for the finding of
violation.
Finally, Commissioner Elman pays respectful obeisance to
Broch. He would require clarity and precision-
Respondents, who will be subject to similar penalties for
disobedience or contempt, should be able to read the order
and know, as clearly and specifically as language can convey,
76The Commission has no hesitation, however, in writing into every orde
otherwise phrased in the words of the Act any interpretive gloss which it has
added. For example, in all §2(d) orders, it regularly adds the phrase "is aTria-
tively" to the general mandate 'made available on proportionally equal terms."
See The Quaker Oats Co., No. 8119, FTC, April 25, 1962; J. A. Folger & Co., No.
8094, FTC, Sept. 18, 1962.
77This has been manifested thus far in §2(d) cases. Much the same issues
are pending in a series of cases involving advertising allowances in the toy industry.
Kohiner Bros., Nos. 8224-31, 8100-04, 8243, 8254, 8258. In these the Hearing
Examiner limited the order to advertising placed in a toy catalog, newspaper,
tabloid, handbill, circular, etc., but had refused to include television advertising.
On apneal, the Commission decided on Sept. 19, 1962, to limit these orders to
pnnt~J prblications alone,
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what conduct is, and is not, proscribed. The agency should
avoid the easy 'solution' of simply incorporating haec verba
general statutory prohibitions couched by Congress, and
justifiably so, in broad, indefinite, and ambiguous terms, rais-
ing questions of interpretation and application that have not
yet been resolved.
The same theme is played with elaboration of the melody in
Commissioner Elman's dissent in Quaker Oats.78 In both cases
Commissioner Elman would have entered an order informing the
respondent specifically what it must do to assure future compliance
with the law In Vanity Fair, he analogized this approach to the
Commission's advertising orders which embodied affirmative re-
quirements. In Quaker Oats he goes further and suggests that once
a violation has been found, he would have both Commission coun-
sel and the respondent thereafter submit a series of proposed
specific changes in operation which would accomplish that end.
The result would be a series of specific yardsticks against which
compliance could be measured, rather than leaving a respondent at
large without either a fair degree of predictability or intelligibility
in what he is required to do.
The majority of the Commission appears thus far to have
rcsisted these suggestions of its lone dissenter by insisting that to
write definitive orders-which are in effect affirmative commands
to follow specific remedial action to achieve compliance-would
constitute an interference with the free enterprise system, or at
least with business management.7 9 Whether to have one's future
7 8 The Quaker Oats Co., No. 8119, FTC, April 25, 1962. "To suppose that
an order framed in the ambiguous and indefinite language of the Robinson-
Patman Act (with its complex of conditions, provisos, and defenses) is 'intel-
ligible to the ordinary businessman, or that he can safely predict' what it will
or will not permit is simply unrealistic."
79 Its position is summarized m the quotation at the begmmng of part IV
The present Commission s obdurate insistence on its own views is not limited to
order writing. In its petition for certioran in FTC v. Exquisite Form Brassier,
Inc., 301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), the Commission stated: "The Court of
Appeals, by its remand, has made the good faith meeting of competition defense
under Section 2(b) available to a seller who is charged with having discrminated
between its customers m violation of Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
By its decision, the court has decided an important and far-reaching question of
Federal law, not yet settled by this honorable Court, which will continue to recur
until finally adjudicated. With due deference to the contrary view of the Court
of Appeals, a majority of its present membership believes that the Commissions
interpretation of Section 2(d) is correct and intends to adhere to it unless and
until tns Court or Congress should determine that the Commissions interpretation
is wrong. As tlus Court has frequently stated, a demal of certiorari is not an
adjudication on the merits. Accordingly, a majority of the Commission as now
(Continued on next page)
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business conduct fettered by being told specifically what the
expert enforcement agency wants to have done to achieve com-
pliance, or whether to be left at large, aidcd only by the skill of
counsel in avoiding possibly massive penalties may not be an
attractive choice. But most businessmen would regard getting the
specific order as finding the Lady rather than the Tiger.
Commissioner Elman's prescriptions for order writing echo
somewhat plaintively the high hopes of the Congressional Com-
mittee Reports in 1959. Whcther this minority voice crying in the
wilderness will be receptively heard by appellate courts remains to
be seen.
As applied to orders in merger cases under section 7 of the
Clayton Act, the use of civil penalty actions may be beset with
difficulties hardly foreseen in 1959 Typically, merger orders em-
body inherent ambiguities. Divestiture is initially ordered of what
was illegally acquired, along with all additions that have been made,
so as to constitute the divested company "as an effective competitor
in substantially all the basic lines of commerce" in which it was
onginally engaged.80 In addition, supplementary prohibitions are
included in the order to prohibit the making of any changes which
might impair the rated capacity or market value of the assets to be
divested."' To deal with these concepts in terms of penalties may
be indeed difficult.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
constituted will not abandon what it believes to be a proper interpretation of
Section 2(d) if review here should not be granted." (Emphasis added.)
The Solicitor General had authorized the filing of the petition without joining
in it. Certiorari was denied on May 22, 1962, FTC v. Exquisite Form Brassier,
Inc., 369 U.S. 888 (1962).
The problems facing counsel for the respondents were icely posed in the
Commissions own petition: "The dilemma facing respondents and hearing
examiners in proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission is also a matter
deserving serious consideration. Federal Trade Commission hearing exanners
are necessarily bound by the ruling of the Commission, despite the court's contrary
holding that the defense may be interposed to a charge of violation of Section
2(d). Respondents' only recourse, therefore, after appeal to the Commission, is to
the Courts of Appeals, where the issue may or may not have been adjudicated.
Assuming, arguendo, that the respondent is successful in a particular circuit, it is
still faced with the necessity of re-presenting the Section 2(b) defense to the
hearing examiner and the Commission, on remand, which is at best a cumbersome
procedure." (Emphasis added.)
In Shulton, Inc. v. FTC, 1962 CCH Trade Cas. 1170,322 (7th Cir. 1962), the
Seventh Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit. Confronted with these statements
in the petition for certiorari, the reception awaiting Commission counsel on further
appeals is hardly enviable.
In J. A. Folger Co., No. 8094, FTC, Sept. 28, 1962, the Commission appears
to have conceded that two courts of appeals suffice.
80 See Crown-Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).
si See Foremost Dames, No. 6495, FTC, April 30, 1962,
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The Commission has also yet to come to grips with final
divestiture. Many of its orders provide merely for the submission
within six months of a written plan for carrying out divestiture,
with the plan to include a date within which compliance may be
effected. Serious questions may exist as to whether this type of
order is final in terms of section 11 (1) of the Clayton Act,8 2 or as
to the circumstances under which the Commission conceivably
could seek civil penalties for non-compliance.
This fragmentary survey of the history of Commission cease
and desist orders, discloses only a few of the many problems that
have arisen in the often seemingly crude and unhappily ngid
drafting process. At the very least it suggests that in many areas
the problem of formulating a precise and specific order, clear as to
scope and reasonable as to coverage, has not been solved up to this
time. Drafting problems are admittedly difficult and intractable.
Yet there are a few encouraging signs that the present Commission
will realistically come to grips with them under either its own
organic statute or the Clayton Act.
Nevertheless, the fiscal sword of Damocles residing in the civil
penalty provisions under both statutes may require the Commission
to do a better job. Agency enlightenment or judicial revolt may
come about either through appellate court review of the cease and
desist orders entered, or through any real attempt at enforcement
through civil penalty actions. Both will bring out into the open
the many problems lurking in general and obscure orders.
Since 1914 the controlling statutes have authorized a reviewing
court to "modify a Commission order" Almost from the begin-
ning, the Supreme Court and many Courts of Appeals have not
hesitated to do so.83 Moreover, they have done so in the face of the
82 See note 33 supra.
83 The earliest case was Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 Fed. 307 (7th
Cir. 1919). Even m the famous Beech-Nut case the order was modified. FTC
v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1921). Through 1944 there appear to
have been 80 modifications out of a total 399 petitions for review. Following the
Supreme Court dictum in 1946 in the Siegel case, znfra note 84, there were fewer
modifications. Of the orders issued after 1944, the reviewing courts modified only
19 of 142 which reached them. Although not sinking to the 7.9% of the 1914-
1924 penod, the percentage of modifications (18.6%) thus receded below the
level of the second decade of the FTC's work (16.3%), and well below its peak
in the 1934-1944 decade (22.2%). But there is increasing evidence that with the
1959 Finality Act and the admonition in Broch, appellate courts may be more
inclined to modify directly or to remand for modification,
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well developed judicial gloss that fundamentally the drafting of
orders should rest in the expertise of the Commission.
The eloquent judicial abdications in Jacob Siege184-that the
Commission has "wide discretion in its choice of remedies deemed
adequate to cope with the unlawful practices"-and in Ruberozd-
that "Congress expected the Commission to exercise a special
competence in formulating remedies to deal with problems in the
general sphere of competitive practices"-have been echoed re-
petitively in all appeals where the reviewing court was willing to
affirm, but unwilling to take on the burden of doing the Com-
mission's job of order writing."- But it is often forgotten that even
in Siegel the Supreme Court reversed the Commission and sent
the proceeding back for adequate consideration of a proper order.
As the Court there pointed out, Congress had in 1914 specifically
empowered the courts to modify a Commission order.
As elsewhere in Commission practice, there is little consistency
in how court modifications are effectuated. In Swanee the Com-
mission urged upon the court that its duty under the statute was to
remand the case to the Comn.ission for modification in accordance
with its mandate, but the court nevertheless entered its own decree
modifying the order.8 In some instances, courts have been content
merely to remand to have the Commission redraft its order.8 7 In
others, the practice is to direct the respondent and the Commission
84 Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946). The Court observed that
the writing of an order was "initially and primarily for the Commission. Congress
has entrusted it with the administration of the Act and has left the courts with
only limited powers of review. The Commission is the expert body to determine
what remedy is necessary to eliminate the unfair or deceptive practices which
have been disclosed. It has wide latitude for judgment and the courts will not
interfere except where the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the
unfair practices found to exist." Id. at 612-13.
85 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952). See also FTC v. Na-
tional Lead Co., 852 U.S. 419, 428 (1957); Exposition Press v. FTC, 295 F.2d
869, 874 (2d Cir. 1961); Kerran v. FTC, 265 F.2d 246, 251 (10th Cir. 1959).
For an example of modification by the Supreme Court, see FTC v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927), where in a §5 case the Court set aside the
portion of the Commission s order reqniring divestiture.
86 Rule 13(1) of the Second Circuit provides for submission of proposed
orders after the court's determination that the existing order is to be modified.
The Commission, objected that the court should remand to the Commission for
a new order in the light of the opinion. It relied upon FPC v. Idaho Power Co.,
344 U.S. 17 (1952); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); and FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co. 309 U.S. 134 (1940). See Commissions Memo-
randum, Docket No. 26311, FTC, July 21, 1961. At the same time the Com-
mission submitted a proposed order which was not limited to transactions through
a third party. The court rejected the Commissions proposal and so limited the
final order.
87 E... Tacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
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to file proposed judgments embodying modified orders. In many
cases, a reviewing court will rewrite an order and enter it directly 88
Whether there are any limits to the power of a reviewing court
to modify a Commission order appears never to have been mooted.
Where a licensing authority is involved, there are possibly limits
beyond which a reviewing court may not trench upon the adminis-
trative discretion conferred upon the agency 8 9 But where in the
exercise of quasi-judicial powers the determination of individual
rights are decided, and the agency order carries the sanction of
heavy civil penalties, it is doubtful that the doctrine of administra-
tive expertise in order drafting may ever override the specific
statutory authority for the reviewing court to modify an order.90
Whether in the future there will be more than lip service to the
dictum in Siegel and the judicial gloss which followed it, or
whether a realization of the impact of the civil penalty possibilities
will lead appellate courts more readily to exercise their historical
powers to modify, will depend on whether better orders emerge
from the agency 91
But the fundamental problems inherent in Commission orders
in the words of the statute that are of ambiguous contour, are more
likely to become acute if civil penalty actions become the vogue.
In advertising cases, there will always be the difficult and elusive
issue as to meaning-whether the newly devised advertisement does,
directly or by implication, make a claim falling with the prohibi-
tion. 2 On conspiracy orders, the issue in the penalty action whether
parallel conduct in pricing resulted from rugged competition or
from agreement will always remain a question of fact to be resolved
on the full evidence.
In Robmson-Patman Act penalty actions, the ambit and variety
88 E.g., Bankers Security Corp. v. FTC, 297 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1961).
89 FTC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952).
90 In Reddi-Spred Corp. v. FTC, 229 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1956), the Com-
mission had originally permitted in a proviso the advertising of butter alone as an
ingredient in margarine if the percentage was dearly stated. On the Commission s
insistence that it has misread the statute, this proviso was deleted by the court.
Reddi-Spred Corp. 52 F.T.C. 1482 (1956). This case suggests that because the
Commission s junsiction is statutory, the power of a reviewing court to confine
it to the subject matter of its statutes cannot be curtailed.
91 If the appellate courts appear willing to modify, it may be expected that
the possible deterrent effect of the present statutory structure, permitting enforce-
ment both by civil penalty and contempt action if there is an appeal, will have
little weight.
9 2 Cf. In re Dolcn C 247 F 2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert, denied, 5
V.S. 988 (1957) (contemt)
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of open questions seemed endlessY3 Undoubtedly, in this area the
Commission will make its usual efforts to claim stare decwszs. It
may argue that its failure to accept a cost accounting justification
in the initial administrative proceeding precludes the offering of a
new or modified cost justification on compliance. It may assert that
its rejection of a claimed good faith meeting of competition in the
original proceeding precludes the advancing of that claim under
changed circumstances in a penalty action.
4
But under the Ruberozd doctrine, there are unquestionably
many areas of justification and defense that can and probably will
elicit extensive trials in a civil penalty proceeding: cost justification;
price changes in response to changing market conditions; and the
good faith meeting of competition.
These possibilities of defending a civil penalty action-which
may prove appealing to both a court and jury asked to exact vast
sums in a civil penalty action-will be open largely to the extent
that reasonableness of coverage and clarity and specificity of what
is prohibited remain lacking in Commission orders.
V
Conclusions and Future Possibilities
A Commission order should accentuate the positive, not the
negative, side of compliance. The order should inform and
direct the respondent not only as to what he may not do,
but as to what he may and must do in order to carry on his
business without again running afoul of the statute. It can-
not be emphasizcd too often that the function of a cease
and desist order is not to punish but to prevent violations
of law The Federal Trade Commission was not estab-
lished as a police court, to impose fines on errant business-
men. The public interest expressed in the Act is not served
simply by collecting fines and pcnalties. The Fcderal Trade
Commission Act is not a revenue-raising or penal measure.
93 Had the modified order in Standard Oil (Indiana) Co., 43 F.T.C. 56, 58
(1946), ever become effective so as to prohibit the respondent from giving a
lower pnce to a wholesaler who sold gasoline to his retail customers at pnces
lower than respondent sold directly to competing retailers, there might have been
presented in a compliance case the nice question whether a Patman Act cease
and desist order can in effect require a respondent to violate the Sherman Act.
94 It Might also contend that an initial agency determination that two products
are of like grade and quility is not thereafter open to challenge in an enforcement
action. The standard Ruberozd form of order leaves this issue open to litigation
in penalty actions.
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Commissioner Elman in The Quaker Oats Co., No. 8119,
FTC, April 25, 1962.
To cavil and to criticize is easy To offer fully practicable
suggestions for improvement in Commission order writing is not.
There are no ready panaceas that can surmount all of the obvious
hurdles. Among these are the inherent and intentional vagueness
of the statutes which the Commission enforces, as well as the
incredibly inept drafting of the Robinson-Patman Act; budget
limitations and the intellectual immobility of some on the staff
of the agency; the equal reluctance of many at the private bar to
embrace new procedures; and perhaps the more basic fact that a
dynamic economy soon out-modes many substantive concepts and
procedures.
Nevertheless, no molehill should labor without a few fleas being
born. Some conclusions, or rather predictions, may be ventured;
and some suggestions offered for remedial action if these forecasts
turn out to be true.95
Two predictions of reasonable validity emerge from this study
The first is that the federal courts will not exact the full measure of
civil penalties authonzed by the Act. The second is that the present
Commission will not substantially change its current order writing
techniques unless compelled to do so by the courts.
I. Only the most sanguine bureaucrat can expect on the basis
of experience that the civil penalty provisions will be applied by
95 The writer is completely certain on only two minor recommendations: (1)
Wherever an appellate court reviews and modifies an order of the Commission,
it is not too much to ask that the opinion set forth in full text at least the
provisions which are being modified. In some cases the courts have done so, e.g.,
in FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922), and in Bankers Sec. Corp. v.
FTC, 297 F.2d 403 (Ord Cir. 1961). But in other cases, such as FTC v. National
Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957), the student or lawyer who wishes to study the
development of the order must wend his weary way through the lower court
opimon, wuch is often again a blank, and back to the Federal Trade Commission
reports which are hardly current. (2) Virtually needed is a comprehensive and
decent digest of all Federal Trade Commission cases. Only a lawyer with the
memory of Lord Macaulay, or the facilities and finances for maintaining his own
elaborate Federal Trade Commission digests, can ever have any secure feeling
that he has examined everything relevant to his problem.
No examination has been made of orders under the other statutes which the
FTC adrmsters. See Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 516
(1918), 15 U.S.C. §61 (1958); Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939, 54 Stat.
1128 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §68 (1958); Public Law 15, 79th Cong. (1945),
relating to the regulation of the insurance business. 59 Stat. 83 (1945), 15 U.S.C.
§1011 (1958); Lanham Trade Mark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C.
§1051 (1958); Fur Products Labeling Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 175 (1951), 15 U.S.C.
(Continued on next page)
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the courts at any level rcmotely reaching tie astronomical monetary
possibilities authorized. Fcw courts will evcn bother to try to parse
the second sentence of thc penalty provision.
II. Despite the most valiant efforts at reform, exemplified in
the present Commission's courageous willingness to modify its
Rules of Practice and to experiment with new procedures, an
administrative agency is an institution. Many lawyers are strangely
resistant to change. Even if the majority of the Commission were
persuaded of the need for major reforms in order writing, it is
difficult to believe that any five men, togethcr with their legal
assistants at the top level, could speedily reverse most of the cur-
rent techniques in order writing.
But as this study suggests, there is considerable evidence that
the majority of the present Commission will not change most of
the current concepts as to how a cease and desist order should be
written, unless and until they are compelled to do so by the re-
viewing cdurts, including the Supreme Court, in each area of the
Commission's enforcement responsibility Or perhaps there may
more dramatically have to be congressional revision of the pro-
cedural sections of the statutes, or the establishment of a trade
court.
There are many who believe that the 1959 Finality Act will set
in motion a pattern of far closer judicial scrutiny and a readier
willingness by reviewing courts to rewrite Commission orders.
This could occur despite the historical gloss suggesting broad
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
§69 (1958); Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 111 (1953), 15 U.S.C.
§1191; Textile Fiber Products Identification Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1717 (1958),
15 U.S.C. §70 (1958). Many of these orders have their own peculiarities, see,
e.g., Paul J. Lighton, No. 8305, FTC, April 25, 1962; but this essay and the
conclusions and recommendations of this section relate cardinally to the enforce-
ment by the FTC of the Clayton Act and §5 of the Federal Trade Conmussion Act.
06 See part I supra. Analytically, the maximum potential liability rmght
be achieved under either the first or the second sentence. For example, a
respondent subject to a Ruberomd type order might make two sales at dis-
crnmnatory prices on two separate days in a calendar month. Each of these would
be a "separate violation" under the first part of the second sentence. Quent: If
these were the only sales made during the month, would the failure to abide
by the order throughout the entire month permit a penalty for "each day of
continuance"? In advertising cases, could it be said that a single television
commercial which falls short of compliance, broadcast 85 mghts on a national
network of 50 stations, will yield a daily penalty of $425,000 and accumulate an
annual penalty of $21,125,000? And how long will the Commission wait to
recommend suit, and thus permit penalties to accumulate? Faced with these
arithmetic possibilities, it seems clear that the Commission will neither ask for
any theoretically full penalty, nor would any court remotely consider exacting
them. But cf. United States v. U.M.W., 830 U.S. 258 (1947).
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deference to the agency's expertise. Although it is often a working
aphorism that things must get worse before they can get better,
there are some who think that on many types of Commission
orders the end of the road has been reached.
History suggests, however, that administrative agencies are
somtimes responsive to demands for a change where an articulate
bar, and dissenting opinions within the Commission itself, keep
pounding away Petitions for review are effective, but usually only
on the particular order. Bar association remonstrance is often taken
as the customary complaint of lawyers who have lost their cases,
and hence is not overly persuasive. Most important perhaps is the
presumptuous, but obviously desirable, offer of provocative analysis
and suggestions.
III. If the Commission were willing to improve its order writ-
ing operations, what basic concepts might be reexamined and what
modified procedures might be useful? Some seven areas may be
offered for consideration:
A. Precedent Industry-Wide Inqurnes. There are some who
believe that the Commission might best return to its historical
function of bringing about changes in business practices that will
reflect compliance with the law, by de-emphasizing its concern with
individual violations and endeavoring paramountly to achieve
industry-wide changes. It is suggested that the cardinal problem in
enforcement is the competitive impact of an individual order rather
than unwillingness to comply 97
If this approach commends itself, it may well be that the
Commission ought to use its abundant investigatory powers, not to
obtain by section 6 mail order inquiries the evidence wanted for
wholesale prosecutions, but to carry on broad scale studies into
industry-wide trends, practices, and the competitive pressures which
have produced them.98 The ready analogue is to the English Royal
97 This is supported by reference to the problems engendered by Moog Indus.
and the Supreme Court directives in affirming that oider. Moog Indus., Inc. v.
FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958). See Tait, Equitable Treatment of Competitors, 1960
CCH Antitrust Law Symposium 75.9 8 On June 27, 1962, the Comnssion placed on suspense four pending cases
involving the advertising of analgesics m order to undertake an industry-wide
investigation of all such advertising. The stated objective is to enable the
Commission to give simultaneous treatment to each advertiser of analgestics
treatment "consistent with that given is competitors." This is a step in the right
direction, but an industry-wide investigation preferably ought to precede any
complants.
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Commission which inquines, recommends, and to an extraordinary
degree bnngs about the kinds of industry changes which ought to
be the fundamental objective of the Commission. 9
Upon completion of its study in depth, the Commission might
in a formal document indicate what practices in the particular
industry it has determined violate the statutes. After an appro-
priate period for readjustment to this codex for the particular
industry, the Commission might then with propriety embark upon
vigorous prosecution by complaint and order.
Whether this will work is difficult to evaluate. Recent experi-
ence suggests that even if a businessman is willing to make drastic
changes or to abandon time-honored practices, he will not, and
with competitive warrant possibly cannot, do so unless he has firm
assurance that his competitors will simultaneously make the same
changes. If this difficulty could be surmounted, the necessity for
individual complaints which raise the problem of how to construct
appropriate orders might be minimized. One answer may be that
an industry-wide determination of the rules of the game may in
itself be useful to a seller in resisting demands by a buyer.
B. Improvement of Consent Procedure. Most complaints are
settled by consent orders. The settlement approach offers wide
opportunity for improvement in order writing, but a strong case
can be made that the new consent procedures recently put into
effect do not do so.
Theoretically, no proposed complaint is now submitted to the
Commission by its staff unless its counsel is prepared forthwith and
solidly to prove the allegations. The order appended to the pro-
posed complaint is supposedly articulated in relation to those
charges. The Commission is called upon to review the proposed
.order not in the light of a developed record, but on what it must
accept in the staff presentation of what Commission counsel be-
lieves might be proved. But no plaintiff's lawyer, or Commission
counsel in support of a complaint, has ever understated what he
thinks he can prove.
09 To a degree this type of approach may be reflected m the June, 1962,
Commission proposals for Industry Guides and General Trade Replations
(Subpart E). On the other hand, these revisions continue to recite that 'general
and special economic surveys and investigations" are in part designed for "the
investigation of possible violations of law" and "the proof of such violations in
adjudicative proceedings." It might also be desirable to avoid the provocative
arguments about the participation of counsel m public investigations.
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Nor is it captious to suggest that, in considenng the consent
order to be offered, the Commission cannot give the proposal the
type of knowledgeable consideration the agency could if it had
before it, not merely the ex parte anticipations of the prosecuting
branch, but also the counter-arguments of the respondent, and,
more importantly, a developed record. At best, the Commission in
approving the proposed order to be attached to the proposed com-
plaint is making a wholly ex parte determination. It is not acting
in its quasi-judicial capacity
But the trouble with the present consent procedure goes deeper.
The proposed order is usually offered to the respondent on a "take-
it-or-leave-it" basis. The boilerplate order is put forward; it is said
that the Commission has already determined that it will accept
only the proposed order substantially in the form submitted; and
the Compliance Division often will not even discuss the impact
of the boilerplate upon the respondent, however much he is willing
in good faith to offer specific programs for compliance.100 Indeed,
in some cases there is even a refusal by Commission counsel even
to discuss such proposals.
This seemingly wooden approach to settlement offers a further
road-block. The respondent cannot get beyond the counsel in
support of the complaint and the staff member from the Office of
Consent Orders.'' Unless they can be satisfied, no settlement is
possible then, and under the new rules, ever thereafter. In effect,
counsel in support of the complaint can foreclose to the respondent
and essentially to the Commission itself any real opportunity to
utilize the consent disposition that is useful and economical, both
for the Commission and the respondent.
Nevertheless, the pnce exacted for the tendered but ngid and
unchangeable consent order is the waiver of appeal, and the fore-
closure of any opportunity to argue to the Commission what would
be appropriate relief.
10 2
100 Occasionally, it is reported, a particularly pertinacious counsel for
respondent can secure some changes m the proposed order; but if the staff lawyers
adhere to the view that they have no latitude, these efforts will fail.
101 Whether the current practice complies with §5(b) of the Administrative
Procedure Act is doubth. That section requires that "the agency" shall afford
an opportunity for submission of a settlement. 60 Stat. 239 (1946) 5 U.S C
§1004 (1958). It is doubtful whether the Office of Consent Orders can be equated
with the Commission, or whether this abdication by the Commission is desirable.
102 It is doubtful whether m a subsequent proceeding, the respondent has
(Continued on next page)
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What needs cardinally to be done in this area of consent
procedure is to afford to counsel in support of the complaint and
to the Office of Consent Orders the same type of freedom for
developing a consent cease and desist order as is given to prosecut-
ing counsel in the Antitrust Division. The apparent apprehension
that any Commission lawyer, who deviates from the cease and
desist order attached to the proposed complaint, risks his official
neck and his record should be dissipated.
Moreover, it might be well completely to eliminate the practice
of attaching proposed orders-which at best have had only ex parte
Commission consideration and at worst only perfunctory review--
and to open the consent procedure to more sensitive and more
productive opportunities for the development of consent cease
and desist orders.
Those opportunities are particularly needed by the smaller
respondents lacking the financial resources to engage in prolonged
heanngs, and upon whom a consent order may have a far more
serious competitive effect. In a real sense these smaller respondents
are often compelled by circumstances to accept a consent settle-
ment, and they are measurably the chief victims of all defects in
the consent procedure.
C. Separation of the Determination of Violation from the Con-
sideration of an Appropriate Order It is a commonplace that in a
trial of an antitrust charge, ordinarily the issue of violation is first
litigated in the federal courts, and thereafter there are submissions
and hearings, often including the taking of additional testimony,
as to appropriate injunctive relief.
103
Some adaptation of this technique to Commission proceedings
is well worth investigating. There are signs that at the Commission
level the necessity for having the benefit of comment and possible
argument on the appropriate order is needed where the Coin-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
foreclosed what could be substantially constitutional objections. See pp. 510-11
supra. Even if the right to contest the text of the order has been waived, the
validity of its application to a new set of circumstances m the future would
plainly still be open.
103 In some cases, it may turn out that the form and mode of relief is of
equivalent importance to the determination of violation. See United States v.
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 126 F Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill. 1954), rev d, 353
U.S. 586 (1957), on remand, 177 F Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1959), remanded, 366
U.S. 316 (1961).
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mission concludes to reverse a dismissal by a hearing examiner or
to broaden the order he has entered. 10 4
As a working suggestion, it might be possible to divide oral
arguments before the Commission into two parts. Argument on
the findings or the existence of violation might precede an inte-
grated argument on the appropriate form of relief.
There is an inescapable feeling among some lawyers that tender-
ing an order to the Commission on appeal, particularly where the
respondent was the winning party before the hearing examiner,
necessarily concedes weakness as to the merits. A rule or statement
by the Commission might provide for separating the argument into
two parts. Both sides would first argue the merits, and then a
further argument on relief would be afforded. 10 5
But the most effective change in consideration upon appeal
would be an extension of present section 4.22(c) to provide that
where the respondent has won a dismissal before the hearing
examiner, there first be a complete Commission determination and
opinion on the merits. If the Commission concludes to reverse,
the proceeding ought then be sent back to the hearing examiner
for his views on an appropriate order with the opportunity of
further appeal, if desired, to the Commission as to form of order. 0 6
Yet, here again, there will have to be a new look at what is an
appropriate order.
D. Required Flexibility in Order Drafting. Both the Commis-
sion itself and cardinally its staff should be freed from boilerplate
104 Section 4.22(c) of the revised Rules provides that where the Comission
contemplates the entenng of a broader order than in the initial decision or where
it reverses a disnussal by the heanng examiner, it will serve a copy of the
proposed order on all parties. Within twenty days, the respondent may file
exceptions to the proposed order with a statement of its reasons in support. If
such exceptions are filed, Comnission counsel gets ten days to file a statement
supporting the proposed order. See Giant Foods, Inc., No. 7773, FTC, June 13,
1962. No formal argument is afforded. Moreover, even if Commssion counsel
has other ideas, he would be quite hardy to suggest that the Commission order
is lacking in any respect. Cf. Paul J. Lighton, No. 8305, FTC, April 25, 1962,
where the Comrmssion modified an order to which neither the counsel in support
of the complaint nor the respondent had objected.
305 There is a further interesting suggestion in Sandura Co., No. 7042, FTC,
June 13 1962 in a proviso permitting certain types of contracts with distributors
provideA the respondent "obtains the Commissions prior approval." While it is
not clear whether this application is made directly to the Commission or the
Compliance Division, this does tend in the direction of affording to respondents
the opportunty to present a plan which will realistically achieve compliance with
the law rather than with the rigid verbal limitations of the cease and desist order.
106 At the very least, any argument on the form of order should follow the
Commission decision to reverse the hearing examiner.
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provisions, and in the now familiar language, every order should be
approached in terms of tailonng the prohibitions to accomplish
compliance in the particular case. As already noted, government
lawyers in the Department of Justice have this freedom to a very
considerable extent. The Commission staff should be not only
authorized, but affirmatively invited, to utilize their talents and
drafting skills in writing responsive orders.
The two objections ordinarily advanced to this type of drafting
freedom seem to be without substance. There appears to be little
merit in the argument that there will be an inappropnate inter-
ference with business management in the writing of affirmative
directions to a respondent which, if followed, will accomplish
compliance with the law. The Commission never hesitates in an
advertising case, or in other deceptive practice cases, to enter what
are in effect affirmative directions. If those directives are followed,
there is no argument about compliance. If business management
wishes to pursue alternatives, it can avail itself of other pro-
cedures. °7
The further objection, loosely derived from Morton Salt, that
the Commission cannot throw upon the courts the burden of
determining whether future conduct violates the law is plainly
overworking the language of that opinion.Y0 8 Where the order is
phrased in the words of the Act, that burden is practically imposed
on the courts in most enforcement proceedings, and particularly in
Robinson-Patman Act cases after Ruberoid has afforded every re-
spondent the opportunity of offering every statutory exception
and justification.
The suggestion that a revolution in both the sensitivity sought
and the effort to be applied in order writing, can be brought about
by Commission directive may be Utopian. Admimstrative reform,
like politics, is the art of the possible. Every private lawyer con-
servatively leans on contract provisions and legal forms which have
run the gauntlet of judicial test. Not unnaturally, Commission
107 Seepp. 521-23, Points E and G, infra. But a combination of both affirmative
directives and boilerplate will not do the job. The specifics of the order in Rayex
Corp., No. 7346, FEC, April 2, 1962, are reasonably explicit. But these specifics
are followed by a tent-like prohibition against p lacing in the hands of others
"means and instrumentalities by and through which the respondent "may deceive
and mislead the purchasing public." The difficulty here is that the order does not
make plain that if the respondent follows the specifies, he is in compliance and
not constantly in an in terrorem position on the rest of the order.
108 See note 68 supra.
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counsel will be drawn toward order language and forms that have
won Commission approval in earlier cases. This is not only the
easy way, but it also offers the advantage of protection against
possibly being sand-trapped by what the respondent offers or
against building a record within the agency for legal ineptitude.
What may be needed is an explicit understanding that the staff
counsel who pioneers in writing better orders will, if the Commis-
sion thinks him wrong, be instructed, rather than castigated directly
or by inference.
Unless the whole area of order writing is thrown open for bold
pioneenng, improvising new techniques, and achieving real clarity,
it will remain the timid, wooden procedure of undeviating insis-
tence upon encrusted boilerplate provisions.
E. Use of Advisory Opinions in the Interpretation of Orders.
During the course of a recent argument on appeal, in which the
propnety of a section 2(d) order written in the words of the Act'
was being argued, Chairman Dixon suggested that any respondent
faced with unresolved questions under a broad order could obtain
a binding opinion letter from the Commission, presumably under
the new advisory opinion sections in the revised rules. 0
This may afford a promising avenue for implementation of the
basic objective of the Commission, not to exact penalties, but to
secure compliance. But once again it offers promise only if its
operation is not confined to the technical parsing of the order, but
instead permits a realistic inquiry into the business facts. Insofar
as consent orders are concerned, there is some barmer in the
limitation that only the complaint and the order subsist in the
record, and only the complaint is available for interpretation of the
order. But this should not foreclose open-minded inquiry and an
attitude that relates the proposed commercial conduct on which
advice is sought to the basic purposes of the statute, rather than
narrowly to the words of the order.
Some have objected on a variety of grounds to this suggestion
for the use of advisory opinions to implement compliance with
orders. There is the objection that an overworked and underpaid
Commission staff should not do the work of private lawyers in
advising their clients. But it will be only in the difficult areas that
109 See §§1.91-1.93 of subpar. (f). In terms, these provisions relate to
violations of the statute rather than of outstanding orders.
KENT cKY LAw JoueNAL[V
an advisory opinion will be sought, and the Commission staff can
readily dispose of the tnvia.
Moreover, the same objections could be offered to the current
practice of obtaining tax rulings or so-called railroad release clear-
ances from the Antitrust Division. For the respondent without
adequate means to secure expenenced legal counsel, the advisory
opinion route might be the only available one; and even for those
who have more expenenced counsel, their talents can be effectively
deployed in the intelligent focusing of the issues and presentation
of the facts in the application for an advisory opinion.
Some at the private bar have objected that the Commission
advisory opinions will always be ngid and narrow, challengeable
only under threat of a $5,000 a day civil penalty, and that one who
has asked and been given a negative answer may be in a prejudiced
position before a court in an enforcement proceeding. Perhaps
the answer to this objection is that it will always remain the
respondent's option. In any event, as an avenue for making orders
work without endeavonng to exact large monetary penalties, it is
worth trying. 0
The use of applications for advisory opinions to explain and,
when necessary, to narrow the application of orders that were too
broadly or too obscurely drafted, necessarily encounters the further
logical objection that it would be equally possible and infinitely
preferable to tailor them to the situation in the first place. So long
as the advisory opinion is not withdrawn, the net result would be
the same as though a fully articulated order bad onginally been
entered. Similarly, if a fully tailored order turns out to be either
too restrictive or overly literal, it always lies in the power of the
Commission to modify it.
F Admmitrative Compliance Consideration. To some extent
it is fair to say that the filing, consideration, and frequent refusal
to accept a compliance report achieves the same purposes that
might be served by a request for an advisory opinion. For some,
the opportunities for informal consultation with representatives
of the Compliance Division, or the exchange of correspondence,
have proved effective. But further consideration and expansion of
110 The use of advisory opinions on the meaning of orders cannot, however
even justify the continued use of present boiler-plate or the continued entry of
order which are framed merely in the words of the statute,
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this type of activity by the Compliance Division might be fruitful.
In the first place, the staff of the Compliance Division ought to
be freely available in discussions of proposed consent settlements.
The occasional adamant refusal of counsel in support of the com-
plaint either to discuss whether a particular form of compliance
will meet the order (on the formal ground that this is not within
his province), or to invite those who will enforce the order to
discuss what it will mean if the respondent accepts it, is often a
complete road-block to settlement.
In addition, some have reported that in discussing compliance
after the order is entered there is an occasional literal adherence
to the words of an order, rather than an open minded approach to
the objectives of the statute involved. This attitude of "the words
of this order are plain, only the Commission can change them" is
somewhat frustrating when what is offered in a compliance report
is on any fair evaluation not in violation of the Act.
Whether Compliance Division discussions with a respondent
are formal or informal, the same approaches and attitudes are
needed that should apply in applications for an advisory opinion.
In this respect, the two procedures represent the obverse and the
reverse of the same valuable coin of effective compliance.
G. Modification of Orders. The number of cases in which
respondents have sought modification of outstanding cease and
desist orders is relatively few Whatever may be the past reasons-
the relaxed attitude of respondents pnor to the 1959 Finality Act,
the hostility formerly displayed to applications for modification, or
the futility of hoping to obtain a meaningful modification-this
route may in the future additionally offer promise for alleviating
both the current problems and achieving real compliance.
In the past, applications for modification have usually rested
on legal arguments, and seldom has there been the introduction of
new evidence at a new hearing. Perhaps where such modifications
are sought, a new effort to refer the application in the first instance
to a heanng examiner for the production of additional evidence,
particularly as to changes in the respondent's operations or in the
industry pattern, might render this avenue more useful.
IV The remaining question is whether civil penalties-the in-
escapable penumbra of $5,000 a day that threatens a respondent
under a broad and ambiguous order-should be wholly abolished.
1968]
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If the conclusion is sound that the courts will never exact the
potentially horrendous penalties specified in the law, and arith-
metically spelled out in some of its legislative history, perhaps a
redxammation of the desirability of this sanction in enforcement
may be warranted.
In terrorem sanctions which no one anticipates will ever be
fully invoked do not make for sound law enforcement. The fact
that the bark of the statute may be far worse than its operating
bite is neither a desirable predicate for legal advice, nor any comfort
to the occasional respondent from whom the full potential penal-
ties may some day be exacted. Only to the degree that an order
is narrow and explicit will penalty actions be effective. Despite
Commission affection for broad orders, it does not follow that
broad orders will ever achieve better compliance."'
In 1936 the Commission itself had advanced the proposal that
where after sixty days an unappealed order became automatically
final, it might somehow be thereafter enforced by contempt action.
The details were not explicated. Perhaps the idea was that the
Commission would simply docket the order in the district court
in which the respondent resided or had its pnncipal place of
business. But some doubts exist as to whether this technique
might not be an invasion of the constitutionally separate powers of
the judiciary, whether a federal court could be put in this minis-
tenal posture, and whether any agency could by its own act
convert its order into a judicial decree."'a There appears to be
insufficient basis to deternine from the Commission's point of
view whether the contempt route or the civil penalty procedure
represents the more effective sanction, and for respondents who
have inadvertently or willfully flaunted an order, whether a con-
tempt proceeding would afford any real comfort or lessening of the
penalty Some insist, however, that the theoretically more flexible
contempt procedure might permit a court more in the Gilbertian
spirit to fashion the punishment to the crime.
Most of us are not without hope that there will be a growing
realization that the cardinal function of the Commission is to
111 Perhaps for tis reason there has not to date been a reported civil penalty
sought in a §2(a) Patman Act order.
l 2 Compare ICC v. Brunson, 154 U.S. 447. 488-89 (1894); State ex rel.
Haughey v. Ryan, 81 S.W 435 (1904); Note, Use of Contempt Power to Enforce
Subpoenas and Orders of Administrative Agency, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1541 (1958).
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achieve industry-wide accomodation to the broadly stated, however
vague, command of Congress in both the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act and the Clayton Act, rather than to collect penalties for
the Treasury What is basically needed is an understanding insight
into the problems that confront respondents subject to obscure
orders who have to continue doing business in the dynamics of a
competitive market, and an avoidance of the idea that it is the
Commission's main assignment to issue a multitude of complaints
and a host of obscurely phrased and broadly applicable cease and
desist orders that leave the recipients subject to astronomically
large potential penalties.
Depending upon what happens during the next few years in the
formulation and enforcement of Commission orders, particularly
those entered under the Clayton Act, it is not unlikely that in this
area of civil penalties, there may be one of the wide swings of the
pendulum that have charactenzed the growth of administrative law
